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Recent Decisions
doctrine may be no more than a myth. The Court has, however, for
this case resolved the conflict between the Congressionally determined
public interest in preserving competition by the prevention of mergers
and the private interests of the parties to this merger in favor of the
public interest. It is submitted that while the Court has not formally
retreated from its contention that the failing company doctrine is a
Congressionally mandated exception to the rule against mergers, this
case, with all others decided by the Supreme Court in which the failing
company doctrine was determinative of the outcome, strongly indicates
that should the Court be placed in the position of having to define the
scope of the doctrine with precision, that definition will be of a class
which has no members.
Although it was the purpose of the Court to "confine the failing com-
pany doctrine to its present narrow scope, ' 42 Citizen Publishing, be-
cause of the new importance attached to efforts short of merger to save
the failing company, represents a considerable narrowing of the doc-
trine as it was announced in International Shoe.
James S. Curtin
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF A LESSOR OF PERSONAL PROPERTY-
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the lessor of a truck is
not liable to lessee's passenger for injuries which resulted from acts
of the lessee, and that Section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts is not applicable.
Littles v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, 433 Pa. 72, 248 A.2d 837 (1969).
Plaintiff, a minor, brought an action for injuries suffered while a
passenger in a truck leased from defendant, Avis. The truck was
leased by one Kemp, who was driving at the time the plaintiff suf-
fered her injuries.
The truck was twenty-four feet long, eight feet wide, approximately
eleven feet high' and weighed eight tons. Kemp was asked by de-
fendant's agent if he had driven a truck before, and he stated he
42. Id. at 931.
1. There is some disagreement in the report as to the height of the truck. The majority
referred to a receipt which recited a height of twelve feet. 433 Pa. 72 at 74, 248 A.2d 837
at 838. The dissent stated the truck was eleven feet high. 433 Pa. at 76, 248 A.2d at 839.
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had driven a pick-up truck. Kemp also produced a valid Pennslyvania
driver's license upon a request by defendant's agent. While operating
the truck, Kemp attempted to drive it under a railroad bridge with
insufficient clearance. The top of the truck struck the bridge, causing
plaintiff's injuries.
The trial court granted a compulsory nonsuit, and denied plain-
tiff's motion to dismiss it. The Superior Court affirmed the denial 2
and plaintiff appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Su-
preme Court affirmed, holding that the lessor had no liability in such
situation.
The plaintiff argued that defendant (through its agent) had been
negligent in leasing such a vehicle to a person it knew or should have
known was incompetent to drive it. It was also alleged that § 390 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts,3 which states that a supplier of
chattels can be liable if he has reason to know that injury could re-
sult from the use of such chattel by third persons, was applicable.
The majority, per Chief Justice Bell, stated that plaintiff had
failed to bring herself within the language of § 390 and that, there-
fore, "we need not decide whether [§ 390] should be adopted by us."4
The court relied heavily on the fact that the Avis agent had asked
to see a Pennsylvania driver's license, and had also inquired whether
Kemp had any previous experience in driving a truck. The court
also pointed out that it was "quite possible . . . the accident was not
due to the inexperience or incompetency of the driver, but rather
to mere lack of attention or error in judgment on his part."'5 In sup-
port of their holding the majority cited Piquet v. Wazelle 6 for the
proposition that an automobile is not an instrument inherently dan-
gerous, and stated that a valid operator's permit is prima facie ev-
idence of fitness to operate a motor vehicle.7
2. 211 Pa. Supr. 745, 235 A.2d 819 (1969).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965) provides:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of
another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his
youth, inexperience or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk
of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in
or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them.
4. 433 Pa. at 74, 248 A.2d 837 at 838.
5. Id. at 75, 248 A.2d at 838.
6. 288 Pa. 463, 136 A. 787 (1927). It was held in Piquet that a defendant-father was
not liable for injuries resulting from the negligence of his driver-son to whom he had
loaned the family automobile because there was no evidence the boy was "incompetent."
Also, the son was not acting as the agent of the father at the time of the accident.
7. The court also cited PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 608(a) (1959):
(a) Before issuing an operator's license to any permittee, except as otherwise
provided, the secretary shall require the applicant to demonstrate personally to him,
580
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The dissent, speaking through Justice Roberts, 8 felt that § 390 of
the Restatement should apply, and also that the case should be re-
manded in order that there could be findings of fact as to (a) what
Avis' responsibility was once they realized Kemp was unfamiliar with
the operation of such a large truck, and (b) if it should be found that
Avis was negligent, whether or not their negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury.9
At common law, generally, the owner of a motor vehicle was not
liable for injuries when the vehicle was operated by a third person,
except in agency situations where the cases turned on questions of
"control" and "scope of employment."'10 An owner of a vehicle has
also been held liable for a third person's negligence when the owner
leased the vehicle plus the driver."
In most jurisdictions there have been exceptions to the requirement
of an agency relationship in cases in which the owner entrusted the
vehicle to one whom he knew, or should have known, to be an incom-
petent, reckless or careless driver and likely to cause injury to others
in operating the vehicle. 12 The cases relating to "careless, reckless and
incompetent" drivers usually have involved drivers who were under-
age,' 3 or drivers who were either drunk at the time the car was loaned
or who had a reputation for drunk driving.' 4
or his representative, in such manner as the secretary may direct, that such applicant
is a proper person to operate a motor vehicle or tractor, has sufficient knowledge of
the mechanism of motor vehicles or tractors to insure their safe operation, and a satis-
factory knowledge of the laws and regulations concerning motor vehicles or tractors
and their operation.
433 Pa. at -, 248 A.2d at -.
8. Justice Cohen joined in the dissent.
9. 433 Pa. 72 at 77, 248 A.2d 837 at 839-840.
10. See Scheel v. Shaw, 252 Pa. 451, 97 A. 685 (1916), where a chauffer received per-
mission from his master to use the master's car to pick up his (the chauffeur's) family, and
while on this excursion he injured the plaintiff. The master (defendant) was held not
liable. The court said the plaintiff, in order to recover from the defendant, must show, in
addition to the fact that the defendant was the owner of the car and the chauffeur was
his servant, that at the time the injury occurred the chauffeur was engaged in the defen-
dant's business and was acting within the scope of his employment. See also Double v.
Myers, 305 Pa. 266, 157 A. 610 (1932).
11. In Thatcher v. Pierce, 281 Pa. 16, 125 A. 302 (1924), defendant leased a truck and
driver for construction work. The court said that a lessor cannot place an incompetent
and reckless person in charge of a machine and expect to escape liability, especially when
the one who was negligent was also his servant.
12. See, e.g., Cebulak v. Lewis, 320 Mich. 710, 32 N.W.2d 21 (1948); Williamson v.
Eclipse Motor Lines, 145 Ohio St. 467, 62 N.E.2d 339 (1945).
13. In Laubach v. Colley, 283 Pa. 366, 129 A. 88 (1925), the court held a father, who
owned the car, liable for injuries inflicted by his driver-son. The father had loaned the
car to his son in violation of a statute setting the minimum age for drivers. (There was no
agency relationship involved in this case because at the time of the accident the son was
not about his father's business.)
14. In Williamson v. Edipse Motor Lines, 145 Ohio St. 467, 62 N.E.2d 339 (1945), the
court discussed at length the rule that when an owner allows a reckless and incompetent
581
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There are few Pennsylvania cases on situations which involve the
entrusting of an automobile to an "incompetent" driver, and it would
appear that an injured plaintiff would have little chance of recovery in
such a situation unless the driver was the agent of the owner. In Raub
v. Donn,6 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that it was not error
to submit to the jury the question of whether or not defendant was
negligent in allowing his son, who had a reputation for reckless driv-
ing, to use the family automobile. However, the court stated that that
finding was not necessary in that case because they held the defendant
liable on an agency theory. In Chamberlain v. Riddle,'16 a nonsuit was
granted in an action against one who had entrusted his car to an
18-year-old unlicensed driver. The court established that the defendant
was not negligent as a matter of law for entrusting his car to someone
who did not have a driver's license. The Chamberlain court also stated:
If the record had shown any circumstances sufficient to acquaint
a reasonably prudent person of some incompetence on the part
of [the driver] then the fact that [the driver] was unlicensed
would have been some evidence of negligence to go to the jury
together with other testimony. . . . However, appellants have
failed to produce any. And, in our opinion, proof merely that
[the driver] had no license is insufficient to show that appellee
was negligent in letting him have his car. We would not impose
a duty upon an owner to see the license card of an apparently ma-
ture and competent person before entrusting his car to him.1 7
In Chamberlain there was no agency relationship.
In Littles, the court adhered to the majority rule that an automobile
is not a dangerous instrumentality. 8 There is one Pennsylvania lower
court decision, however, which has held that when one allows another
to drive his automobile, and the driver is known to be reckless and
incompetent, whereby the automobile becomes a dangerous instrumen-
tality in his hands, then the owner may be liable for the driver's negli-
gence.' 9 The case involved an automobile dealer who had allowed a
driver to operate his motor vehicle the owner is liable for resulting injuries. The court
did not hold the defendant owner liable in that case, however, because the court said
that, although the driver had a reputation for drinking and driving, the defendant had
made inquiries about the driver's competence and was not informed about his reputation.
15. 254 Pa. 203, 98 A. 861 (1916).
16. 155 Pa. Super. 507, - A.2d - (1944).
17. Id. at 511,- A.2d at-.
18. For a jurisdiction which holds that an automobile is a dangerous instrumentality
see Koger v. Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779, 108 S. 685 (1940), and Southern Cotton Oil Co. v.
Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 S. 629 (1920).
19. Eachus v. Cadillac Motor Car Company, 18 D&C 754 (1932).
582
Vol. 7: 579, 1969
Recent Decisions
prospective purchaser with a reputation for reckless driving to drive
one of its cars. The court held that there should be a trial on the
merits, and evidence of the defendant's knowledge of the driver's in-
competency should be heard at trial.
It appears that, aside from the one lower court decision, the only
situation in which an owner was held liable in Pennsylvania for the
negligence of a bailee (or lessee) in the absence of an agency relation-
ship was in Laubach v. Colley20 which involved an underage son. In
situations not involving agency, the Pennsylvania courts have almost
uniformly given judgment for the defendant-owner.
Other jurisdictions have determined that for public policy reasons
the above result was not satisfactory, and therefore have enacted stat-
utes which recognize the liability of an automobile owner who has
entrusted his car to a negligent driver.21 In California, an owner has
statutory liability for death or injuries which result from negligent
operation of a vehicle by any person operating it with the owner's ex-
pressed or implied permission. This liability is absolute and is not even
dependent upon the owner's negligence in selection of the driver.22
Pennsylvania does not have a statute extending the common law
liability of automobile owners for the negligent operation of their cars
by third persons. However, it would appear that the instant court may
have declined an opportunity to at least reach the limit of common
law liability.
Although the instant court cited Piquet v. Wazelle23 to the effect
that an automobile is not an inherently dangerous instrument, it is
submitted that this is not to say that an eight-ton truck is not, or at
least cannot be, an inherently dangerous instrument (even in the
hands of a licensed driver), especially when the driver has had little or
no truck driving experience. Although a valid Pennsylvania operator's
20. 283 Pa. 366, 129 A. 88 (1925). See discussion at note 13, supra.
21. E.g., IOWA CODE § 321.493 (1966):
In all cases where damage is done by any motor vehicle by reason of negligence
of the driver, and driven with the consent of the owner, the owner of the motor ve-
hicle shall be liable for such damage.
See also Mich. - § 9.2101, 401 (1949); New York Veh. & Traf § 388 (McKinney 1959).
22. E.g., CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17150 (West Supp. 1967):
Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to
person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the
operation of a motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any
person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the
owner.
See discussion of a prior similar provision of the California Vehicle Code at 14 HASrINGS
LAw JOURNAL 436 (1963).
23. 288 Pa. 463, 136 A. 787 (1927).
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license may be prima facie evidence of competence to operate an
automobile, surely it should be a rebuttable presumption, at best, as
to the holder's competence to drive the type of vehicle involved in the
present case.
There is an increasing volume of truck rentals today. In addi-
tion to the major rental companies, there are scores of others leasing
trucks for do-it-yourself moving jobs. An increasing number of gas
stations have trucks available for hire. In view of this, it would seem
that the court should have approached the issue from the point of view
of public safety. As a result of the instant decision, it is apparently
now the law in Pennsylvania that anyone who can produce a valid
Pennsylvania operator's license can go to a rental office, rent a large
and powerful vehicle and drive it onto the public streets, and the ren-
tal company will be free of liability for the driver's negligence-
whether or not the lessee is, in fact, inexperienced or incompetent to
drive such a vehicle.
It is submitted that although a valid operator's license is prima
facie evidence of competence to operate an automobile, the lessor of a
larger and more powerful vehicle should have more of an obligation
than merely asking to see a driver's license. Perhaps in Littles, the
lessor had discharged that obligation by asking if the lessee had had
any previous truck driving experience. However, the matter of whether
or not the lessor had acted in a reasonable manner in believing the
driver was "competent" was a question of fact, which should have
been determined by a jury, as suggested by the dissent. 24
The majority stated there was "no evidence of any knowledge on
the part of the lessor of lessee's inability to drive a truck or any reason
for lessor to have taken any more precautions than it did before leas-
ing the vehicle. '2- It seems just as valid to say that there was no real
evidence of lessee's ability to drive such a vehicle, and that it was in-
cumbent upon Avis to determine the driver's ability before leasing the
truck. The majority also said it was "quite possible . . . the accident
was not due to the inexperience or incompetency of the driver, but
rather to mere lack of attention or error in judgment on his part. 26
The reverse was also quite possible, i.e., that the accident did result
from his inexperience or incompetence, and therefore this also appears
to be a question within the province of a jury.
24. 433 Pa. at 78, 248 A.2d at 839-840.
25. Id. Pa. at 75, 248 A.2d 837 at 838-839.
26. Id., 248 A.2d at 838.
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In an action between an innocent third party and a rental company
which chose to lease a large and powerful truck relying simply on the
lessee's having a valid driver's license, it would certainly appear that
Restatement § 390 could easily apply; and the questions of whether
or not lessee was "incompetent" or "inexperienced," and whether or
not the lessor knew or should have known of the incompetence or
inexperience were questions for jury determination. It does not appear
to be unreasonable to include this risk as a part of the "cost" of engag-
ing in the truck leasing business.2 T
In this connection, it appears to be relevant that the Pennsylvania
Motor Vehicle Code was amended in 1968 to require a special test to
qualify a person to operate a motorcycle. Upon qualification a special
notation is made on the operator's license, and the statute specifically
provides that "any licensee whose operator's card has not been so
marked and who operates a motorcycle shall be deemed to be operating
a motor vehicle without a valid license. 28
It appears to be somewhat ironic that in a state which requires one
to take a special test before he is qualified to operate a motorcycle,
the Supreme Court requires no "special" precautions by a lessor before
he entrusts a lessee with an eight-ton truck.
Janet M. Nolan
27. The Justices said that if one engages in the business of renting automobiles to
persons of unknown responsibility it is not unreasonable to require him to be responsible
for any damage which such person may inflict on the general public.
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 608(b) (Supp. 1968).
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